Testing for Altruism and Social Pressure in Charitable Giving
Stefano DellaVigna, John A. List, Ulrike Malmendier
The Quarterly Journal of Economics / NBER · 2012
Abstract
Separates genuine altruism from social pressure as motives for charitable giving, asking how much donation is driven by wanting to give versus not wanting to say 'no' to a solicitor.
Methodology
A door-to-door fundraising field experiment that randomized whether households were forewarned of a solicitation (via a flyer announcing the exact time), giving them a low-cost way to avoid the ask; a structural model recovers altruism and social-pressure parameters.
Findings
Letting people opt out of being asked reduced giving, revealing that a meaningful share of donations is motivated by the social cost of refusing rather than by altruism. Because avoidance can lower donors' own welfare, some solicited giving is welfare-reducing for the giver.
Applied nudge
Social pressure reliably raises compliance but can leave the person worse off—prefer giving an easy, dignified opt-out to cornering users, and reserve high-pressure asks for genuinely welfare-improving actions.
Citation
DellaVigna, S., List, J. A., & Malmendier, U. (2012). Testing for altruism and social pressure in charitable giving. Quarterly Journal of Economics, 127(1), 1-56.
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