Trust Games: A Meta-Analysis
Noel D. Johnson, Alexandra A. Mislin
Journal of Economic Psychology · 2011
Abstract
A cornerstone meta-analysis of the investment (trust) game introduced by Berg, Dickhaut & McCabe, synthesizing 162 replications to establish robust base rates for how much people trust strangers and how much that trust is reciprocated across cultures and designs.
Methodology
Meta-analysis pooling 162 replications of the standard trust game, coding moderators such as the size of the stakes, whether payoffs were real or hypothetical, the use of the strategy method, student vs. non-student samples, and the region in which the experiment was run.
Findings
On average trusters send roughly half of their endowment, but trustees return slightly less than was sent—so trust is typically only partially rewarded. Amounts sent are higher when trustees are randomly (not strategically) matched and lower in student samples; stakes and geography systematically shift behavior.
Applied nudge
Treat first-mover trust as the scarce resource: reduce the perceived vulnerability of the initial action (small first commitments, escrow, reversibility) rather than assuming reciprocity will be complete.
Citation
Johnson, N. D., & Mislin, A. A. (2011). Trust games: A meta-analysis. Journal of Economic Psychology, 32(5), 865-889.
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