The Behavioralist as Tax Collector: Using Natural Field Experiments to Enhance Tax Compliance
Michael Hallsworth, John A. List, Robert D. Metcalfe, Ivo Vlaev
Journal of Public Economics / NBER · 2017
Abstract
Tests whether low-cost behavioral messages on tax letters can accelerate payment of overdue taxes, providing rigorous field evidence for social-norm nudges in public finance.
Methodology
Large natural field experiments with the UK tax authority, randomizing the wording of payment reminder letters—including social-norm statements ('the great majority of people pay their tax on time') and public-goods framings—across tens of thousands of taxpayers.
Findings
Social-norm and public-good messages significantly increased the share of taxpayers who paid and sped up payment, bringing forward substantial revenue at negligible cost; norm messages that localized or personalized the comparison were most effective.
Applied nudge
A single accurate social-norm sentence ('most people like you have already paid/upgraded/enrolled') is one of the cheapest, most reliable levers for prompting overdue action.
Citation
Hallsworth, M., List, J. A., Metcalfe, R. D., & Vlaev, I. (2017). The behavioralist as tax collector: Using natural field experiments to enhance tax compliance. Journal of Public Economics, 148, 14-31.
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