Active vs. Passive Decisions and Crowd-Out in Retirement Savings Accounts: Evidence from Denmark
Raj Chetty, John N. Friedman, Søren Leth-Petersen, Torben Heien Nielsen, Tore Olsen
The Quarterly Journal of Economics, 129(3), pp. 1141-1219 · 2014
Edited by Paweł Raja, PhD · Published · Updated
Paper details
- Authors
- Raj Chetty, John N. Friedman, Søren Leth-Petersen, Torben Heien Nielsen, Tore Olsen
- Published
- 2014, The Quarterly Journal of Economics, 129(3), pp. 1141-1219
- DOI
- 10.1093/qje/qju013
- Study design
- Observational / administrative data
- Full text
- Free PDF · Free PDF of the working-paper version (NBER Working Paper No. 18565), hosted at nber.org. Cite the published version and check page numbers against it.
Summary
Uses population-scale Danish data to ask whether tax subsidies or automatic contributions do more to raise retirement saving, distinguishing 'active savers' who respond to incentives from 'passive savers' who follow the path of least resistance.
Methodology
Analysis of administrative records covering millions of individuals, exploiting policy variation and job changes that shift automatic employer pension contributions, to decompose responses into active and passive.
Findings
About 85% of individuals are passive savers who do not respond to tax subsidies; each krone of subsidy generates very little new saving because it mostly shifts assets across accounts, whereas automatic contributions raise total wealth roughly one-for-one. Defaults reach the many; price incentives reach only the attentive few.
Applied nudge
For the large passive majority, automatic contributions build wealth that tax incentives never will—set the beneficial flow as the default rather than rewarding the minority who already optimize.
How to cite this paper
Chetty, R., Friedman, J. N., Leth-Petersen, S., Nielsen, T. H., & Olsen, T. (2014). Active vs. passive decisions and crowd-out in retirement savings accounts: Evidence from Denmark. Quarterly Journal of Economics, 129(3), 1141-1219. https://doi.org/10.1093/qje/qju013
Also circulated as NBER Working Paper No. 18565.
BibTeX
@article{chetty2014active,
author = {Raj Chetty and John N. Friedman and Søren Leth-Petersen and Torben Heien Nielsen and Tore Olsen},
title = {Active vs. Passive Decisions and Crowd-Out in Retirement Savings Accounts: Evidence from Denmark},
journal = {The Quarterly Journal of Economics},
volume = {129},
number = {3},
pages = {1141--1219},
year = {2014},
doi = {10.1093/qje/qju013}
}Cite this page
Raja, P. (Ed.). (2026, 19 Oct 2026). Summary: Active vs. Passive Decisions and Crowd-Out in Retirement Savings Accounts: Evidence from Denmark. Behavioral Economics Lab. https://www.behavioraleconomicslab.com/journals/active-passive-retirement
Where this research is used
- Bias: Default Effect
- Bias: Status Quo Bias
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