Save More Tomorrow (SMarT): Committing Future Pay Raises to Retirement Saving
Edited by Paweł Raja, PhD · Published · Updated
In the first implementation of Save More Tomorrow at a midsize US manufacturing company, 78% of the employees offered the plan joined, and their average saving rate rose from 3.5% to 13.6% of pay over 40 months and four pay raises (Thaler & Benartzi, 2004). This is a before-and-after comparison of participants, not a randomized experiment.
Average saving rate of SMarT participants (% of pay) · Before–after (participants)
Before joining SMarT: 3.5% → After four pay raises (40 months): 13.6% (+10.1 pts, +289% relative)
This compares the same participants before and after; there is no randomized control group.
Study details
- Study design
- Before–after (participants)
- Problem
- Many employees in defined-contribution retirement plans save little or nothing, less than life-cycle models predict. Thaler and Benartzi argue that some of these low savers are making a mistake they would welcome help with, because of bounded rationality and self-control problems: people put off raising their contribution, and an increase that cuts take-home pay feels like a loss.
- Intervention
- Save More Tomorrow (SMarT) asks employees to commit now to contributing more later. Contributions rise with the first paycheck after each pay raise and keep rising at each scheduled raise until a preset maximum. Employees can opt out at any time. Because each increase comes with a raise, take-home pay does not fall.
- Outcome
- Average saving rate of SMarT participants (% of pay): 3.5% (Before joining SMarT) → 13.6% (After four pay raises (40 months)); +10.1 pts, +289% relative
- Sample
- First implementation at one midsize manufacturing firm: 315 eligible employees; 162 joined SMarT (78% of those offered the plan)
- Key takeaway
- Tying saving increases to future raises lets people act on a wish to save more without a cut in today's take-home pay. Inertia, which usually keeps saving low, then works to keep them in the plan: 80% of enrollees were still in it after the fourth raise.
- Biases involved
- Present BiasLoss AversionStatus Quo Bias
- Source
- Thaler, R. H., & Benartzi, S. (2004). Save More Tomorrow: Using behavioral economics to increase employee saving. Journal of Political Economy, 112(S1), S164-S187. doi:10.1086/380085Numbers checked against: Abstract (78% joined; 80% stayed through the fourth raise; 3.5% to 13.6% over 40 months). Enrollment counts (315 eligible, 162 joined) are from the authors' 2001 working draft and match the published 78% take-up
What the study did
Thaler and Benartzi designed SMarT as a prescriptive program, one built to correct predictable saving mistakes rather than only describe them. Each feature targets a behavioral regularity. Enrollment happens well before the raise because commitments about the future are easier to make than sacrifices today. Increases start only when pay goes up, so the higher contribution never shows as a cut in nominal take-home pay, which loss-averse savers resist. Increases continue automatically, so inertia and status quo bias keep people in the plan.
The first implementation began in 1998 at a midsize manufacturing company that had low participation and low saving rates. The company hired an investment consultant and offered a one-on-one meeting to every employee eligible for the plan. The consultant recommended a higher saving rate. Employees unwilling to accept an immediate increase were offered SMarT, with contributions set to rise by 3 percentage points at each annual raise. That was an aggressive schedule, since raises averaged only a little more than 3%.
The published paper reports that a high share of those offered the plan joined (78%), and that the vast majority (80%) remained in it through the fourth pay raise. Average saving rates for SMarT participants rose from 3.5% to 13.6% over 40 months. The paper also describes two later implementations of the program; the headline numbers come from the first, which had run the longest.
Limitations and caveats
- There is no randomized control group. The rise from 3.5% to 13.6% compares participants with themselves before they joined, so it is not a causal effect estimated against an untreated group, as in the field experiments elsewhere in this database.
- Participants selected themselves into SMarT, and they were the employees who had turned down the consultant's advice to save more immediately. The result describes that group, not the whole workforce.
- The headline result comes from a single firm where the plan was offered in personal meetings with a consultant. Take-up may be lower when the plan is offered with less personal contact.
Further sources
- Our research summary: Save More Tomorrow™: Using Behavioral Economics to Increase Employee Saving
Cite this page
Raja, P. (Ed.). (2026, 16 Oct 2026). Save More Tomorrow (SMarT): Committing Future Pay Raises to Retirement Saving. Behavioral Economics Lab. https://www.behavioraleconomicslab.com/findings/save-more-tomorrow
Primary source: Thaler, R. H., & Benartzi, S. (2004). Save More Tomorrow: Using behavioral economics to increase employee saving. Journal of Political Economy, 112(S1), S164-S187.